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Anglo-American analytic philosophy in the twentieth century has had a deep 
interest in problems associated with language.1 Critics of analytic. philosophy 
frequently dismiss this preoccupation with linguistic analysis as philosophy’S 
abandonment of its responsibility to probe the perennial profound questions 
about our universe and human existence. But this criticism reflects misunder-
standing of the reasons for philosophy’s fascination with language. For, at its 
best, analytic philosophy is interested in language not for its own sake but 
because of the conviction that careful analysis of certain central issues in the 
philosophy of language sheds significant insight upon recurring problems in 
other areas, such as the philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, and even 
ontology. 
The emphasis upon linguistic analysis has had both a negative and positive 
impact upon Christian theology. The negative impact, due to the wholesale 
assault by the Logical Positivists upon metaphysics (including theology) as 
cognitively meaningless2 is well known.明Thatis not so widely appreciated, 
however, is that recent work in the philosophy of language has provided tools for 
clarifying some central issues in Christian theology as well. 
For example, throughout the centuries, a central problem in Christian 
theism has been the status of what are often called “divine predicates”， that is, 
terms such as‘loving’，‘good’，‘wise’，‘strong’，etc. which are applied to God. God 
is said to be an in宣nite,transcendent, limitlessly perfect Being whereas we are 
finite and imperfect creatures. Meanings of terms such as 'wise’and ‘loving’are 
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intimately related to出efinite context in which they originate and are generally 
used. How, then, can they be used meaningfully of an infinite and transcendent 
God? Philosopher Frederick Ferre expresses the problem this way: 
Either human language is allowed to retain its meaning, drawn from human 
experience of the finite, in which case抗cannotbe about the God of theism, 
who is not supposed to be finite or to be properly describable in finite terms; 
or language，‘purified’of its anthropocentric roots, is emptied of meaning for 
human beings, in which case it can be neither human language nor一．．． 
us一 aboutGod... If uni vocal，出enlanguage fals into anthropomorphism 
and cannot be about God; if equivocal, then language bere立ofits meaning 
leads to agnosticism and cannot for us be about God.3 
τ'he options here seem to be mutually exclusive: Ei出erterms have出esame 
meanings when predicated of God that they have when predicated of creatures 
or they do not. If they retain the same meanings then it cannot really be God that 
we are talking about, since we are engaging in anthropomorphism. But if they 
acquirn entirely different meanings then how can the statements in which they 
function be informative for us? 
In this paper I wil focus upon this question in an effort to illustrate how 
analytic philosophy in this century impacts a central issue in theology. Some 
philosophers answer the question by asserting that no predicate terms can be 
meaningfully applied to God.官iemost notorious example here is the influential 
movement known as Iρgical Positivism, which wil be briefly examined. But most 
theologians and philosophers have answered the question in terms of the 
analogical predication of God and creatures, an answer given classic expression 
by St. Thomas Aquinas.τ'he central insights of Aquinas wil be noted, after which 
attention wil be given to some recent analytic philosophers who have helped to 
d紅均themodel of analogy. 
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I. Iρgical Positivism 
During the 1950s and 1960s philosophical and theological journals in the 
West were saturated with seemingly endless discussions of出e“meaningfulness”
of religious discourse.4 The agenda for discussion was set largely by Iρgical 
Positivism, an extremely powerful movement in its day. Logical Positivists5 
embarked upon an ambitious course intended to“set philosophy upon the sure 
path of science”and, as a result of出is,to eliminate al metaphysics -including 
theology一企omserious philosophical inquiry. Positivism launched a vigorous 
attack upon出eologyas being “cognitively meaningless’＼官iequestion was not 
how terms ordinar均rused in discourse about finite creatures could be applied 
meaningfully to God; rather it was whether one could make any informative 
statement about God at al. At the apex of the assault A J.Ayer brashly asserted 
“To say‘God exists' is to make a metaphysical utterance which cannot be either 
仕ueor false.”6 Theologians scrambled about madly trying to appease出eircritics 
and salvage their calling. 
Al仕ioughthe claim that we cannot speak informatively about a transcendent 
God is implicit in the thought of the 18th century Scottish philosopher David 
Hume, it was not until the early decades of the 20血centurythat this was made 
explicit and vigorously defended by a major philosophical movement. Whereas 
Hume and Immanuel Kant had attacked metaphysics on the ground that 
(supposedly) we are not αble to know metaphysical truths, Iρgical Positivists went 
a step further and claimed that there are no metaphysical truths to be known. The 
language of metaphysics, including theology, is cognitively meaningless. Talk 
about God may serve other valuable functions (e.g. it may be comforting or 
inspire one to act in certain desirable ways) but it is not informative since it does 
not constitute meaningful statements about God which訂eeither true or false. 
How could metaphysics be so easily eliminated企omthe realm of informa-
tive discourse? In retrospect it is dificult to appreciate the intense seriousness 
with which Positivists' claims were taken. But we must remember that the 
philosophical climate of the early 20th century was shaped by tremendous 
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advances in the philosophy of science, mathematics, and logical theory, and thus 
scientific method, rooted in empirical observation, provided the paradigm for 
knowledge. The motivation behind Positivism was not so much overt hostility to 
theology as it was a desire to provide a comprehensive model for genuine 
knowledge which was grounded in what was taken to be paradigmatic -the hard 
physical sciences. 
Positivists asserted that they had found a criterion by which they were able 
to distinguish between al cognitively meaningful statements and those 
utterances which, although they may intialy appe訂 tobe meaningful, are in fact 
cognitively meaningless.τbis criterion was given various names, but is generally 
known as the Verifiability Principle.7 The positivists' argument against the 
meaningfulness of talk of God can be expressed in the following syllogism: 
(1) A neccessary condition for any statement S being a factually informative, 
or cognitively meaningful, statement is白atS be in principle verifiable or falsifi-
able. 
(2) Because of the implications of the doctrine of God’s transcendence, 
fundamental statements about God are neither verifiable nor falsifiable. 
(3) Therefore, fundamental statements about God are not factually 
informative. 
τbe Positivists were attempting to formulate an adequate general criterion of 
factual meaning. Presupposed by this was the notion that al informative non-
analytic statements must be, at least in principle, empirically testable or capable 
of being shown to be true or false (or at least probable or improbable) by 
reference to specifiable empirical da包underspec国ableconditions.百iecriterion 
was obviously derived from the methodology of the physical sciences. 
Since the argument form of the above syllogism is valid, if both premises are 
true then the conclusion also must be true. Initially, philosophers and 
theologians by and large accepted the truth of the first premise, and白usthose 
who wished to deny the conclusion were forced to argue that premise (2) was 
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somehow inadequate. Some readily conceded that religious discourse is not 
cognitively meaningful, that is, that社doesnot constitute factually informative 
statements which are true or false. Rather, they argued, religious utterances 
serve other “non-cognitive”functions, such as expressing intentions to carry out 
certain behavior policies (Braithwaite), or are re自ectionsof “bliks”or ultimate 
ways of interpreting the universe (Hare), or function as part of a unique 
“language game”with its own internal criteria of adequacy (Phillips).8 
Others contended (rightly）出atnon-cognitivists seriously misinterpreted the 
nature of religious discourse. For when Christians speak of God they intend to be 
making actual statements about God which are true.τbus various ingenious 
arguments were put forward to show that talk about God was in fact verifiable or 
falsifiable (at least in principle) and thus passed the Positivists' litmus test for 
cognitive meaning. Undoubtedly仕iemost famous and influential such attempt 
was John Hick’s proposal of“eschatological verification”9. Hick argued that the 
possibility of experiential confirmation of key theistic statements is built into the 
Christian understanding of God. Thus, the statement “God exists" is indeed 
cognitively meaningful since there are conceivable states of affairs (perhaps not 
in this life but in the life to come) which would remove al grounds for rationally 
doubting the truth of the statement. Hick suggests that survival of physical death 
and the experiences of the fulfillment of God’s purposes for us (as these are 
disclosed in the Christian Scriptures), and of communion with God as revealed in 
Christ would constitute in principle verification of the statement “God exists”. If 
Hick’s argument is successful, then clearly premise (2) of the Positivists' 
訂gumentmust be rejected and the challenge of verifiability has been met on its 
own terms. Even on the Positivists’own criterion for cognitive meaning, then, 
也lkabout God cannot be ruled out as meaningless. However Hick’s proposal 
stimulated a vigorous discussion in philosophical journals, and it is by no means 
clear that his notion of eschatological verification wil meet the Positivists' test for 
cognitive meaning .10 
But increasingly it became clear that the Verifiability Principle itself was 
highly problematic, and thus白atthere was good reason for rejecting the first 
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premise of the Positivists' argument. The di節cultywas in articulating an 
adequate formulation of the Principle. This proved to be notoriously dificult. In 
the early days of the Vienna Circle (a group of philosophers, scientists, and 
mathematicians which met together in仕ie1920s and 1930s) it was held that the 
cognitive meaning of a non幽analyticstatement is determined by the experiences 
that would conclusively verify it. But this proved inadequate since，剖nongother 
problems, it ruled out as meaningless al statements of universal scope (e.g.“All 
crows are black”） , as they cannot, even in principle, be conclusively verified by 
experience. Regardless of how many crows have been observed to be black it is 
always logically possible that tomorrow a crow wil be discovered which is not 
black.11 This, of course, would have disastrous consequences for science -
something the Positivists could not allow. 
Taking their cue from Sir Karl Popper’s discussion of falsifiability in science, 
some Positivists then suggested that conclusive falsifiabiliか， insteadof verlか
αbility, should be the criterion of factually meaningful statements.12 But出istoo 
proved unsatisfactory. For although conclusive fals泊abilitydoes allow for the 
informative nature of universal statements （“All crows are black" can in principle 
be falsified by finding one crow that is not black) it does not allow for the 
meaningfulness of many existential statements. For example, ''There is at least 
one unicorn" must be judged meaningless (and not simply false) because 
regardless of how much one searches and fails to find a unicorn it is always 
possible that one wil be discovered tomorrow. Furthermore, the falsification 
criterion was plagued by a disturbing asymmetry between the meaningfulness of 
a statement and its contradictory.“＇All crows are black" is meaningful because 
falsifiable, whereas its contradictory，“There is at least one crow that is not black" 
must be judged unfalsifiable and thus meaningless. 
These, and similar, di盟cultiesled to the abandonment of the notion of 
“strong”or conclusive verifiability or falsifiability. What followed were many 
attempts to arrive at an adequate weaker criterion of “testability”or“confirma-
ti on", the most famous of which was A J.Ayer’s immensely influential work 
wnguage, T.γut~， α悦dLogic.13 
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We cannot here pursue discussion of the many attempts to arrive at an 
adequate formulation of the Principle. Su箇ceit to say that no one was able to 
formulate a version of the Principle which would allow for the meaningfulness of 
obviously meaningful statements (including many statements of science) and yet 
which would rule out as meaningless many obviously non”sensical statements. 
Many philosophers pointed out hat the statement of the Ver出abilityPrinciple 
itself was in question since it could not, even in principle, be confirmed or 
disconfirmed by any experience. On its own terms, then, should we not reject 
the statement of the Principle as cognitively meaningless? By the mid-1960s it 
was clear that the Positivists' criterion for cognitive meaning was in serious 
trouble. Alvin Plantinga spoke for many when he stated “…the fact is that no one 
has succeeded in stating a version of the verifiability principle that is even 
remotely plausible; and by now the project isbeginning to look unhopeful.’山And
speaking of the challenge to theism posed by the Verifiabili旬Principle,George 
Mavrodes observed “the challenge itself is so muddled that theologians, as well 
as religious laymen, might reasonably be excused from responding to it until 
philosophers have formulated it in some more coherent terms."15 Although there 
have been some attempts in recent years to reconstruct a satisfactory version of 
verifiability, 16Iρgical Positivism as a philosophical movement today is dead and 
most philosophers would agree that the attempt to formulate an adequate 
general criterion of cognitive meaning is misguided. 
Much philosophical water has passed under the bridge during the past forty 
years. The great irony in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy is that 
whereas Logical Positivism as a movement has been thoroughly discredited, the 
philosophy of religion (and Christian philosophical血eologyin particular) is one 
of the most flourishing and respectable branches of contemporary philosophy. 
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I. Analogical Predication 
It is sometimes assumed that twentieth century analytic philosophy has 
been primarily shaped by the methodology and agenda of Logical Positivism, and 
thus that philosophy’s sole concern with religious discourse has been to show 
出at出elatter is cognitively meaningless. But this is simply not the case. Analytic 
philosophy in this century has had an abiding interest in a cluster of problems 
associated with language, and developments in recent years, far from promoting 
the Positivists' agenda, have proven to be immensely helpful in clarifying certain 
problems central to Christian theistic discourse. One such problem is the status 
and meaning of terms used in talk of God. 
This is not a new problem. Questions about the adequacy of human 
language to capture the divine reality were carefully addressed by some of出e
early Church Fathers, with many early theologians opting for a version of the via 
negativα，or way of negation.17 The via negativa maintains that terms denoting 
positive attributes cannot be applied to God, although negative terms which 
signify what God is not may be predicated of God. That is, although we cannot 
speak meaningfully of what God is, we can speak informatively about what He is 
not. The via negativαhas always exerted considerable influence in Christian 
theology and serves as a corrective to those who tend to obscure the notion of 
God’s transcendence. However, as St Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) was later to 
show, the via negativαcan only function satisfactorily if we first have some 
positive identifiable knowledge about God.18 
St’Thomas Aquinas and Analo由r
Aquinas moved the discussion of divine predication forward considerably 
with his theory of analogical predication of God and creatures. In the statement 
by Ferre quoted at the beginning of this paper there seem to be only two options: 
Either words such as‘wise’have precisely the same meanings when used of God 
and of creatures (they are used univocally) or they have entirely different 
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meanings (they are used equivocalか＇）.But Aquinas pointed out that there is a 
third option. Words can be used analogically of God and creatures. That is, words 
used in divine predication have meanings similar to, but stil distinct from, the 
meanings they have when used of ordinary creatures. Aquinas developed his 
theory of analogical predication19 with considerable subtlety and sensitivity to 
language, and it is a tribute to his genius that many of his insights have been 
confirmed by recent work in the philosophy of language. However, his 
discussions are also marred by some erroneous views about the nature of 
language and some questionable metaphysical assumptions. 
We might summarize in a very general way Aquinas' theory of analogical 
predication as follows. Since God is a categorially unique, transcendent, infinite 
Being words used in divine predication cannot be used in precisely the same 
senses in which they are used of creatures. But neither can they be used in 
entirely different senses or they wil be uninformative. They must thus be used in 
a sense similar to, but stil distinct from, the senses in which they are used of 
creatures. They must be used analogously of God and creatures. 
Aquinas held that informative analogous predication presupposes血atthere 
is an actual ontological similarity between God and creatures. He further held 
that this element of ontological similarity can be established by demonstrating 
that there is an in仕insicrelation of e血dentcausality between God and creatures 
(viz. God is the cause of the analogous perfection -e.g. wisdom-found in the 
creature) and by appealing to the scholastic principle of likeness between cause 
and effect (omne agensαgit simile sibi). This principle, widely accepted by 
scholastics, maintains that there is no cause (properly defined) whose effect does 
not bear some similarity to出ecause. Thus the term ‘wise’，when used of God, 
has a meaning similar to but somehow distinct from its meaning when used of 
ordinary creatures.百iesimilarity in meanings is based upon the ontological 
similarity (in some respects) which obtains between God and creatures. 
Howeveζin spite of the significant insights it advances, Aquinas，仕ieoryhas 
been subjected to some strong criticism. He accepts some questionable 
assumptions about the nature of language and meaning, such as the ideational 
25 
Talk of God 
theory of meaning. Furthermore, his contention出atterms used analogously of 
God and creatures refer to irreducibly analogous concepts (viz. no concepts can 
be applied univocally to God and creatures) has met much criticism from no任
Catholic philosophers. Critics point out that on Aquinas' theory it is di韻cultto 
escape theological agnosticism.20 
But undoubtedly the major reason for dissatisfaction today with Aquinas' 
views on divine predication is not due to any semantic deficiency in the theory 
itself but rather to the questionable metaphysical assumptions it embraces. 
Aquinas looked to a comprehensive theory of analogy to provide answers to two 
distinct questions: 
(1) How do we know that God has the particular attributes we ascribe to 
Him? 
(2) How can we meaningfully use terms which are ordinarily used of 
attributes found in creatures to refer also to attributes found in God? 
Analogy was thus developed as bo白 anontological and a linguistic relation. The 
answer to (1) was provided by natural theology and the analogia entis (analogy of 
being): Aquinas tried to establish aロontologicalrelation of analogy between God 
and creatures by arguing that since God is the cause of creatures He must 
possess al the perfections that they possess, and that since God is the self.” 
subsistent Being He must have every conceivable perfection. Having answered 
(1), Aquinas was then in position to answer (2) on the basis of the ontological 
relation of analogy between God and creatures and the purely linguistic 
phenomenon of analogical predication. But it is the metaphysical assumptibns 
operative in his discussion of (1）出atprovoke the greatest criticism of Aquinas' 
theory of analogy by recent philosophers. 21Few philosophers outside of 
Thomistic circles find his answer旬（1)convincing, and since questions (1) and 
(2) are intimately linked in Aquinas' discussion his views on divine predication 
are often treated with skepticism as well. 
It is crucial, however, to see that questions (1) and (2) above are logically 
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distinct. It is possible to reject Aquinas' answer to (1) and stil re也inhis central 
insights regarding (2). In a seminal article in 1976 philosopher Patrick Sherry 
recognized this and called for a fresh look at Aquinas’theory of analogy: 
It is the ontological and epistemological foundations of [Aquinas'] teaching 
on analogy which arouses the greatest disquiet among many theologians 
and philosophers, rather出anits linguistic aspect... Most philosophers訂e
more opposed to the Naturalτ'heology which undergirds Aquinas' teaching 
on analogy than to his views about predication as such .It does raise the 
question whether we can accept the philosophical or theological objections 
to Thomistic metaphysics and yet salvage much of Aquinas' teaching on 
analogy. It is conceivable出atanalogy as a linguistic theory can stand on its 
ownfeet,or出atalternative religious or metaphysical supports are possible.22 
Certainly questions (1) and (2) above are related. A satisfactory answer to (2) 
presupposes that we can (at least in principle) know that God has certain 
a位ibutesand not others. But there are various ways of answering (1) apart from 
the route of natural theology advocated by Aquinas. Indeed, question (1) 
constitutes one of the central issues in the philosophy of religion. But it is 
entirely legitimate for one to claim to be able to answer (1) on出ebasis of divine 
revelation，出eChristian Scriptures, and then on白atbasis to proceed to answer 
(2) accordingly. 
Ludwig Wit匂ensteinon Family Resemblance and Lan惇1ageGames 
百lemajor insights from Aquinas are (a) the recognition白atwords used in 
divine predication must have meanings which are significantly similar to, yet 
distinct from, meanings the same words have when used in non-theological 
discourse, and (b) the fur血erobservation出atthe phenomenon of analogy in 
ordinary discourse provides a key to understanding terms used in religious 
discourse. Significantly, these fundamental insights have been amply 
corroborated by recent work in linguistics and the philosophy of language. 
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Perhaps no one has influenced recent philosophy of language as much as 
the late Cambridge philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (d. 1951). Two of his 
contributions in particular have great relevance for the problem of religious 
discourse. First, although he did not actually use出eterm ‘analogy’he called 
attention to the phenomenon of analogy in ordinary discourse. He carefully 
pointed out that the same words, when used in contrasting linguistic 
environments, can have related but distinct meanings. 
τbere are words with several clearly defined meanings. It is easy to tabulate 
仕1esemeanings. And there are words of which one might say：百1eyare used 
in a thousand different ways which gradually merge into one another. No 
wonder that we can’t tabulate strict rules for their use.23 
And in a classic passage, Wittgenstein analyzes the many uses and meanings of 
the word ‘game’and notes that although there is something that is common to al 
games, the different meanings of‘game’（e.g. board games, card games, ball 
games, social games) are significantly related and share in a kind of “family 
resemblance”. 24 The various meanings share in “… a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing”.25 What Wittgenstein had in mind 
with his notion of “family resemblance”seems to have been the same 
phenomenon Aquinas referred to by the term ‘analogy’． 
Second, Wittgenstein made a major contribution by emphasizing the 
importance of understanding the “form of l江e”or“language game”in .which 
discourse occurs for grasping the meaning of a particular term. 26'Strike’will 
mean one thing in the language game of a labor dispute or contract negotiation 
but wil mean something quite different in the language g出neof baseball. And 
one can only understand the meaning of a word in a given language game if he is 
acquainted with the form of life (viz. the relevant practices, beliefs, activities, 
goals, etc.) which accompany the language game. Wittgenstein’s point is出is:
One must become (somewhat) acquainted with the relevant discourse 
environment if one is to understand出emeanings of key terms in the discourse 
in question. 
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James Ross on Meaning Extension and Analogy 
Unfortunately, Wittgenstein never worked out in a rigorous manner what 
was meant by “加nilyresemblance" and “language game”. The later notion is 
particularly vague. 27However in an important and rigorous recent work 
philosopher James Ross has impressively developed Wittgenstein’s basic insight 
and has drawn a distinction between what he cals “craft-bound”and “unbound” 
discourse.28 Craft-bound discourse is a kind of discourse in which relevant “skil 
in action”is necess訂yfor the ful grasp of the discourse. Technical philosophical 
discourse, legal, medical, political, auto-mechanical discourses are al examples 
of craft-bound discourse. At least some mastery of the relevant craft is necessary 
for comprehension of the key terms used in craft-bound discourse. Unbound 
discourse, by contrast, is readily accessible and does not require mastery of any 
special craft. 
Ross identifies several distinctive features of craft欄bounddiscourse. 1.) Part 
of its vocabulary has a担nitiesand oppositions of meaning which訂edetectably 
different from those of the same words in unbound discourse. 2.) Although one 
may already know how to speak the relevant natural language (e.g. English), one 
has to learn how to use craft-bound discourse. 3.) Usually, a craft“bound 
discourse has, in addition to words that occur in other craft-bound discourse, a 
vocabulary of its own that is internally interde:fined and. is equivocal with the 
S剖newords used in contexts outside the craft. (It may be that some words do not 
occur outside the craft at al.) 4.）官iediscourse serves to motivate and regulate 
human behavior in pursuit of the relevant objectives of the craft. 5.）官iere訂e
conditions for the acceptability of utterances for communication in pursuit of 
cra立objectiveswhich are more stringent than仕iosefor unbound discourse. That 
is, there are often restrictions upon paraphrase, implication, or qualification 
which do not apply to the same words in unbound discourse. 
Given the description above, it is clear that he discourse of Christian theism 
is an example of craft-bound discourse. One will not really understand the 
meanings of key predicate terms used in talk of God unless one has (to some 
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extent) become an“insider”to the activity and discourse environment of 
Christian theism. This does not mean that旬lkof God is somehow abnormal or 
esoteric, for in this respect Christian theism is no different from such ordinary 
activities as plumbing, gardening, baseball, or auto-mechanics - al of which 
employ craft圃bounddiscourse. Nor does this mean that only Christians can 
understand Christian theistic discourse, or出atthere is no continuity between 
the meanings of terms used in theological discourse and the meanings of出e
same terms in unbound discourse, or that the “logic”of theistic discourse is 
somehow autonomous and internal to the Christian “language g出ne”.The point 
here is simply that the meanings of predicate terms used in talk of God are 
largely determined by the subject matter, activities, and objectives of Christian 
theism, and that unless one is familiar with仕iesethe meanings of such terms 
wil be unclear. Much of the problem with the earlier Positivists' attack upon 
metaphysics, and Christian出eismin particular, was due to a fundamental failure 
to recognize the great diversity in discourse environments and to pay su血dent
attention to the distinctive environment in which talk of God occurs. Instead, 
Positivists imposed from outside an arbitrary criterion of cognitive meaning, and 
thus it is hardly suprising that they found that religious discourse failed to pass 
their litmus test. 
Wittgensetin’s insight concerning “おmilyresemblance”， noted above, has 
proven to be helpful in clarifying what Aquinas seems to have meant by 
analogical predication of God and creatures. Taking a cue企omWittgenstein, a 
number of recent philosophers have suggested that what Aquinas had in mind 
can be explained in terms of the linguistic phenomenon of meaning extension. 
Language is flexible and is constantly undergoing change. Words with accepted 
and established uses and meanings are frequently given extended meanings in 
more specialized kinds of discourse (e.g.‘force’or‘mass’in physics；‘strike’in 
baseball；‘brief’in legal discourse, etcよBernardHarrison correctly observes 
that meaning extension is “too common and familiar for its existence to be 
denied”.29 An example of meaning extension is the word ‘car'. Originally ‘car’ 
denoted a kind of cart, but over time its use was extended to new contexts so that 
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it came to refer to the automobile as well as the cage of an elevator. 
Since meaning extension is an integral feature of living natural languages, 
perhaps key terms used in religious discourse should also be regarded as 
products of meaning extension. Several philosophers have recently suggested 
that words such as‘loving’，‘wise’， and ‘good’， when used in divine predication, 
are actually words taken from ordinary discourse and given extended meanings 
in the context of Christian theistic discourse. For example, in an influential 
article James Ross stated 
官1emeanings of terms in religious discourse are to a large extent derived. 
There does not seem to be serious disagreement over出atview, adopted by 
Alston and common to most persons who have discussed the matter. At least 
minimally, it is believed that one learns how to use such predicates in 
religious discourse only after having learned some other kind of use for 
those predicates ...官官justificationfor using such terms of God is that they 
already have a very wide range of uses in non-religious contexts, and that we 
are merely continuing an on-going process of stretching.30 
It does seem出atmany of the predicate terms used in talk of God are indeed 
ordinary terms which have been given extended uses and meanings, and白at
their meanings in the theological context訂eparasitic upon their meanings in 
other non-theological contexts. Surely the meaning of‘love’in“God is love" is 
significantly similar to, and actually dependent upon, the meaning of 'love’in “A 
fa血erloves his children". However, it is important to see that meaning extension 
by itself is incapable of guaranteeing the informative nature of talk of God. 
For one thing it seems clear that not al words used in talk of God are 
ordinary terms with extended meanings. Some words are indigenous to religious 
discourse and do not seem to have a pre-religious use (e.g.‘holy’，‘sin’，‘Holy 
Trinity’，‘God’） ; and other terms seem to be used univocally （吋z.with the s出ne
meaning in each case) of God and creatures, and thus cannot be regarded as 
products of meaning extension (e.g.‘one’，‘being’， predicate terms used in 
negative predication, syncategorematic terms such as 'not’，‘every’， 6江，etc.)
Furthermore, it is often assumed that meaning extension is a one-way stret, 
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going企omnon-religious discourse to Christian theistic discourse. But might it 
not also be仕iecase that meaning extension proceeds from仕ieisticdiscourse to 
non-religious contexts? This seems to be the case with words such as‘sin’and 
‘God’， which have been given extended meanings in non-religious contexts (e.g. 
“It is a sin for anyone to be so good at the piano！” or “Adam Smith is the god of 
free market capitalism”）. But江so,then a model of meaning extension which 
appeals to the original pre-religious meanings of terms to justify use of the same 
terms in religious contexts cannot establish the meaningfulness of al terms used 
in talk of God. 
But undoubtedly the greatest di盟cultywith the meaning extension model is 
that社providesan answer on the level of diachronic linguistics to a question 
raised on the synchronic level. Diαchronic linguistics is concerned with the 
historical development of natural languages, or h出ecase of semantics, with the 
relationships between meanings of words over an extended period of time, 
whereas synchronic linguistics and semantics are concerned wi出 linguisticand 
semantic relations at any given moment m time, such as the present.31 The model 
of meaning extension sketched above explains the changes in word meaning 
over a period of time, and thus is an example of diachronic or etymological 
semantics. And it may well prove useful in understanding the etymolo幻rof 
certain religious terms. But simply appealing to a model of meaning extension is 
not su血dentto guarantee the informative nature of divine predication. Words 
change in meaning. Sometimes the extended meanings of words remain signifi 
cantly related to the original meanings (e.g.‘car' as originally referring to a cart 
and白enlater referring to an automobile), but sometimes they do not (e.g.‘nice’ 
once meant “sily”but through a series of changes社cameto mean, among other 
things，“precise”） . Thus meaning extension can result in homonymy or 
equivocation. 32
τberefore, even江itis granted that, etymologically, most predicate terms 
used in句lkof God are the product of meaning extension, how do we know that 
such meaning extension has not resulted in homonymy? How do we know that 
‘wise’does not have entirely equivocal, or different, meanings in “God is wise” 
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and官eis a wise man”？羽Thatneeeds to be shown is that current uses of ‘wise’ 
result in significant relatedness of meanings in the two sentences. And meaning 
extension by itself cannot do this. 
James Ross, quoted above, recognized the inadequacy of his earlier model of 
meaning extension and embarked upon an intensive study of the linguistic 
phenomenon of analogy. Ross' findings are published in Portraying Analogy, 
where he concludes白atanalogy, defined in terms of relatedness of meanings of 
words used in two or more distinct discourse environments, is far more 
pervasive and integral to natural languages than even Aquinas had imagined. He 
convincingly demonstrates that ordinary discourse makes extensive use of 
analogy, indeed出atanalogy is indispensable to ordinary discourse. Analogical 
predication in Christian discourse, then, is not an abnormal or deviant kind of 
predication. And ifit is an essen丘alfeature of ordinary discourse it is superfluous 
to demand justification for it in general. It follows then that Prima facie use of 
analogical predication in Christian theistic discourse need not be regarded as 
suspect. 
The significance of Ross' study is not simply that he demonstrates that 
analogical predication is integral to ordinary discourse, but that he provides a 
clear model for identifying instances of analogical predication which can be 
applied on the synchronic level. Ross is concerned strictly with the linguistic 
phenomenon of analogy, and not with any ontological issues which might 
accompany analogical predication of God and creatures, and his model provides 
a workable mechanism for identifying cases of analogical predication simply by 
analyzing the linguistic and syntactical relations among words. Ross' discussion 
is highly technical and details of his model need not concern us here. Perhaps it 
will SU血ceto note that his model is based upon careful analysis of出esyntactical 
relations among words in various discourse environments (what is called a 
“predicate scheme”） , including their relations with near-synonyms, antonyms, 
contraries, and their capaci句rfor similar paraphrase in other words. Application 
of his model to religious discourse reveals that terms such as 'wise’，‘good’， 
‘loving’，‘strong’， etc. are indeed used analogously of God and creatures；白atis, 
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there is significant relatedness of meanings in the uses of the terms in the two 
contexts. If we are justified on other grounds (e.g. due to divine revelation) in 
believing that God is wise, for example, then on Ross' model we can demonstrate 
出at‘wise’in“God is wise”has a meaning similar to, but stil distinct from, the 
meaning of‘wise’in“Socrates is wise”. The meanings of‘wise’in the two cases 
are related but not entirely出esame. And this is precisely what Aquinas had 
pointed out in his own way seven centuries earlier. 
William Alston and Literal Talk of God 
It is almost axiomatic in much contemporary theology that one cannot speak 
literaly of God, that is，出atone cannot use predicate terms literaly in talk of 
God. Thinkers as diverse as R. Bul住iann,P. Tillich, K. B訂出，I.M. Crombie, and 
LT. Ramsey, al seem to hold that religious discourse is inherently highly 
symbolic, which usually seems to mean that it is metaphorical and not literal. 
Tillich, for example, declared that the only non-symbolic asser世onwe can make 
about God is “the statement hat everything we say about God is symbolic”. 3 
God is said to be so“wholly other”，so transcendent出atterms cannot be literaly 
applied to Him without resulting in absurdity. Now no informed believer would 
deny that many statements about God include highly metaphorical use of terms. 
The following statements include rich metaphors: 
The Lord is my shepherd. 
His hands prepared the dry lands. 
官ieIρrd is my rock and my fortress. 
But the question here is whether αl talk of God must be metaphorical, or 
whether it is possible to speak literaly of God as well. 
One thinker who has given this issue much thought in recent years is the 
distinguished Christian philosopher of language William Alston.34 Alston's 
discussions are rigorous, technical, and informed by a thorough understanding 
not only of central issues in the philosophy of language but also of the context of 
Christian theism. Several points from his essays訂eworth mentioning here. 
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In the article “Irreducible Metaphors in Theology" Alston considers the 
question whether al talk of God must be metaphorical or whether it is possible to 
apply some terms literaly to God. A metaphor is said to be irreducible if what it 
says cannot be said, even in part, in literal terms. In answering this question 
Alston draws several important distinctions, one of which is the Saussurian 
distinction between language and speech. A natural language is an abstract 
system, including mo叩hemesand various syntactic relations, which is used for 
communication and thought. Speech, in the technical sense, is the use of出at
system (language) in communication. What is commonly referred to as the 
“problem of religious language" is then really a misnomer: the problem does not 
concern religious language itself (the syntactical and semantic relations of the 
terms) but rather concerns what one says when using religious language.百ie
problem is thus a problem of religious discourse or speech. 
How does this apply to the question of literal or metaphorical也Ikof God? 
Alston notes that often theologians speak in terms of the literal meaning or 
metaphorical meaning of a word (e.g.‘love’） , and conclude that it cannot have a 
literal meaning when applied to God. But this, he claims, is a confusion. The 
terms ‘literal’and 'metaphorical' do not stand for meanings of words but rather 
refer to contrasting uses of terms. A metaphor is an example of a figurative use of 
a word (or group of words) and stands in contrast to the literal use of出eword.35 
官isdistinction leads naturally to白edefinition of the word ‘literal’， which 
Alston defines as roughly ‘use in an established sense" 
A term can be said to be used literaly when it is used in such a way也at出e
meaning of the sentences in which it occurs is a determinate function of one 
of its senses .Whenever we use an expression wi血anassigned meaning we 
are using it literaly.36 
To use a word literaly, then, is to use it in a manner that accords with its 
established, accepted use.明弓1enI make literal use of a predicate term in a 
subject/predicate statement, I utter the sentence wi出theclaim that the property 
signified by the predicate term is possessed by the subject, or holds between the 
subjects, if the predicate is a relational one. 
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Alston notes that‘literal’has often been taken to mean something like 
“precise”，“factualぺ“empirical”，“ordinary”， and“univocal”. But this is highly 
misleading. He is worth quoting at length on this point. 
However common the conflation, it is simply a confusion to suppose that 
‘literal’， in the historically distinctive sense just set out, implies any of the 
features just mentioned. Meanings that words have in a language can be 
more or less vague, open-textured, unspecific, and indeterminate in a V出iety
of ways. Hence I can be using words literaly and stil be speaking vaguely, 
ambiguously, or unspecifically. Again, I can be using my words just as 
literaly in asking questions, cursing fate, or expressing rage, as in soberly 
asserting that the cat is on the mat.τbe conflation of ‘literal’with ‘empirical’， 
on the other hand, is something more than a vulgar error; it 児島ctsa basic 
issue in the philosophy of language as to the conditions under which a word 
can acquire a meaning in the language. If this requires contact with 
“experience”in one or another of the ways spelled out in empiricist theories 
of meaning, then only舵rmswith“empirical”meaning can be used literaly, 
for only such terms have established senses. But that doesn’t follow from 
just the meaning of the term ‘literal’；it also requires an empiricist白eoryof 
meaning, and it is by no means clear that any such theory is acceptable.37 
Now itis crucial to see that‘literal’is not synonymous with ‘univocal’. For 
'univovcal’is used to compare two or more uses of a single term, and applies 
when the same meaning is preserved in the several uses; 'literal’， on the other 
hand, refers to a single use of a term, and applies when the term is used in an 
established sense.τbus the question whether a term such as 'wise’is used 
literaly or metaphorically of God is quite different from the earlier question 
whether ‘wise’is used analogously or univocally or equivocally of God and 
creatures. On Alston's definition it is perfectly possible for 'wise' to be used both 
literaly and analogously simultaneously. 
百iequestion whether we訂eusing terms literaly in旬lkof God is really the 
question whether there are established and accepted senses of the terms in 
divine predicatiQn such that one can say what one wishes to communicate by 
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directly exploiting those senses. Clearly there are established and accepted uses 
and meanings of such key predicate terms as‘loving’，‘wise’，‘good’， etc. in 
Christian theistic discourse. Accordingly, we may be said to be using ‘wise’， for 
example, literally in statements such as“God is wise”. Of course, it does not 
follow from this that we are using ‘wise’in precisely the s出neway in“God is 
wise" and “Socrates is wise”. For, as we have seen, terms can be used literaly 
and analogously simultaneously. Although we cannot reproduce it here, we 
should note白atAlston provides an extended rigorous argument demonstrating 
that in subject/predicate sentences about God which include metaphorical use of 
the predicate term, the propositional content of the metaphorical statement can 
also be expressed literaly. Alston, then, goes against much contemporary 
theology by rejecting the common assumption that metaphorical statements in 
talk of God make use of irreducible metaphors, or in other words, that the 
propositional content of the metaphors cannot be expressed, even in part, in 
literal terms. 
It should be evident from even this brief discussion出atanalytic philosophy 
in this century has been much concerned with problems of Christian theistic 
discourse, and出atin spite of the earlier hostile assault upon theology by Iρgical 
Positivism, more recent analytic philosophers have made some valuable 
contributions toward clat鵠ringthe status and meaning of predicate terms used in 
talk about God. 
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